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Religious Networks in Post-conflict 
Democratic Republic of the Congo:  
A Prognosis
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Abstract
The role of religion and religious networks in public life is gaining increasing 
attention in contemporary social science discourses against the backdrop of 
ascendant religiosity in many non-Western societies. In Africa, the reality 
of ascendant religiosity is exemplified by the phenomenal growth in the 
membership of the two leading religions – Christianity and Islam – and the 
increase in the number of other syncretic sects. Within this context, religious 
networks have emerged as important actors in civil society and as powerful 
forces for social mobilisation, albeit for both constructive and destructive 
ends. With reference to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
religious groups wield enormous influence in the public space as providers 
of social services in a polity that has been characterised by years of misrule, 
declining state capacity and protracted conflict. The conflict in the DRC has 
deepened the imperative for constructive engagement by faith-based groups 
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in the public domain, especially in facilitating the peacebuilding process. 
Against this background, this paper examines the roles of religious networks 
in the DRC’s public sphere in the post-conflict epoch and prognosticates the 
future of the country.
Introduction
Those who neglect religion in their analyses of contemporary affairs do 
so at great peril (Berger 1999:18).
Berger’s assertion is underscored by the realisation of the increasing 
socio-political role of religion in human affairs, or as Rubin (1994:20) 
puts it, its ‘profound political influence in public life’.1 In fact, religion 
features prominently in public life in relation to many social phenomena. 
For example, Wilson (1982:34) aptly notes that religion often serves to 
legitimise the purposes and procedures of society; sustain men in their 
struggle; justify wars; provide explanations for misfortunes; function as a 
platform for dispute resolution; and prescribe techniques with which people 
could undertake daily tasks or once-in-a-lifetime enterprises. Paradoxically, 
religion (and its role in society) has been a subject of intense debate over the 
years. For much of the twentieth century though, religion was ignored or 
marginalised in the analyses of social, economic, and political phenomena. 
This was due largely to the dominance of non-eschatological paradigms, 
which were influenced primarily by the Age of Enlightenment as well as the 
writings of philosophers. Haynes (1993:6) notes that ‘the analysis of political 
behaviour for the greatest part of the twentieth century was dominated 
by the modernisation and political development paradigm, dependency/
underdevelopment, neo-Marxist and other radical perspectives’. Religion 
1 It is instructive to note from the outset that religion plays different, contradictory roles 
in public life. In some instances, religion has been a force for bad, as exemplified by the 
culpability of religious actors in a number of conflicts around the world and the legitima-
tion of violence through religious rhetoric. On the other hand, there is ample evidence, 
which suggests that religion also serves as a resource for peace. This is illustrated by the 
positive role of faith-based organisations in social service delivery and facilitating peace-
building. That religion functions as a force for both good and bad depicts the socially 
ambivalent character of religion in public life.
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was considered as purely tenacious and atavistic. At best, religion was 
ignored; at worst, it was regarded as ‘an opium’ (à la Marx) and completely 
denounced. 
The promise held forth by the dominant theories of liberalism, modern-
isation, and Marxism, spawned the prediction of the decline or demise of 
religion. Cox (1965:1) and Wallace (1966:264) had predicted that religion 
was to disappear and become consigned to history. In other words, the 
decline (and the possible extinction) of religion, in view of the inception of 
modernity, was expected. According to Rubin (1994:21), it was anticipated 
– in the West during the 18th, 19th and (early part of the) 20th centuries – 
that ‘modern ideas, such as science, technology, secularism, and humanism, 
would overcome the religious concepts that dominated premodern society’. 
Lubbe (2002:237) notes that this expectation was informed by the conviction 
that ‘modernity goes hand in hand with a decline in religion’. The advent 
of the Cold War reinforced the fervour concerning the atrophy of religion 
as ideologies such as capitalism, socialism/communism, imperialism, and 
nationalism gained ascendance in the analyses of issues. Again, religion was 
viewed as ‘irrational and premodern’ (Weigel 1991:27; Reychler 1997). In the 
defunct Communist bloc, religion was officially stigmatised and repressed. 
In the West, it was regarded as a remnant of tradition. Religion was simply 
depicted as ‘epiphenomena’ (Haynes, 1993:6). The tendentious treatment 
of religion in both academic circles and in the public domain promoted 
secularisation. The futuristic resurgence of religion was not anticipated. 
However, in deference to Crawford’s (2002:204) opinion that religion 
has a way of revitalising itself, the resurgence of religion (in the form of 
intensifying religiosity) has been witnessed in Africa and Eastern Europe, 
thereby stultifying the central propositions (associated predictions) of 
Marxism, modernisation, and development paradigms vis-à-vis its future.
The ‘crisis of modernity’, according to Lubbe (2002:240), is one of the 
three factors that account for the renaissance of religion. The inability of 
modernity (and secular philosophies) to furnish convincing explanations 
regarding the origin and destiny of human life has made religion attractive. 
Hence, Rubin (1994:23) submits that ‘the secret of the influence of religion 
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in contemporary politics is that the modernization process, rather than 
causing religion to weaken and disappear, often makes its public role stronger 
and a more necessary part of the process of state-building or revolutionary 
transformation’. Furthermore, the contradictions of globalisation (such as 
the mass movement of refugees and economic immigrants across national 
boundaries, and the weakening of state boundaries) have resulted in the 
loss of identity and national self-confidence in many societies. The search 
for identity has led many to religion. In addition, ‘political uncertainty and 
financial risks’ associated with the globalised environment induce volatility 
and instability that necessitate considerable adjustment. Within this milieu, 
religion is seen as a stabilising factor since it ‘provides humanity with a sense 
of direction and destiny’ (Lubbe 2002:240).
The above submissions find practical expression in many societies in the 
Third World, particularly in Africa, such that ‘the political importance 
of religion reverberates with special strength in these societies’ (Rubin 
1994:22). For example, the Commission for Africa (CFA) (2005:120) notes 
the astounding increase in religiosity in Africa, which is underpinned by 
certain causalities. The CFA argues that nationalism in Africa is exhausted 
and that its place has been overtaken by religion. Bunting (2005) adds that 
‘politicians and state structures have lost almost all credibility or legitimacy’. 
Consequently, religion has emerged as a strong socio-political factor in 
galvanising people such that it cannot – and should not – be ignored in the 
analyses of contemporary issues – in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, religion 
is assuming greater importance in many countries irrespective of their level 
of economic development (Thomas 2000:817). Given this context therefore, 
it is apposite to examine the underlying dynamics of intensifying religiosity 
currently underway in Africa. One of such dynamics is the increasing 
importance of religion in the public domain (especially in countries that 
have a weak state apparatus) such that faith-based actors are often co-opted 
into crucial local and national decision-making structures and processes in 
that they are a key constituency in civil society. In this paper, we use the DRC 
to illustrate this fact. But first, it is appropriate to highlight briefly religious 
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affiliation in the DRC with a view to depicting the influence of faith-based 
networks in the country.
DRC: Religious Demography
In Africa, nowhere is the strategic importance of the religious constituency 
more apparent than in the DRC, where faith-based networks wield 
enormous influence over large sections of the national population. The 
country’s religious demography attests to this: the DRC has a huge Christian 
population (put at 80%), predominantly Roman Catholic. Approximately 
50% of the DRC’s population is Roman Catholic, 20% is Protestant, 10% 
is Kimbanguist, 10% is Muslim while the remaining 10% comprises other 
religious organisations, syncretic sects and traditional religions.2 It is stated 
elsewhere that 16.5% of the population is Kimbanguist and that Islam ‘counts 
only a small number of adherents in DR Congo, perhaps 1% of the population 
and principally clustered in a few cities’.3 This is significantly divergent from 
the 10% estimation given above, thus confirming the existence of conflicting 
figures on religious affiliation in the DRC. In fact, what comes across in the 
comparison of figures on religious affiliation is the imprecision of statistics as 
a majority of Congolese, for instance, are not identified exclusively with any 
one religious group. Basically, DR Congo’s religious configuration exhibits 
overlapping affiliations, which make exclusive categorisations difficult. In 
addition, religious identity in DR Congo (as with class and ethnic identities) 
is often situational and based on pragmatism.4 
Figures provided by the World Christian Encyclopedia regarding religious 
affiliation in the DRC prove useful in another regard: they indicate the 
annual growth rate of each religious group, thus enabling inferences as 
to the extent of religiosity as well as the attendant influence of religious 
2 Although there are conflicting statistics as to religious networks’ membership profile in the 
DRC, these figures have gained wide acceptance in official circles. See About.com. n.d. (a); 
Answers.com. n.d. and United States Department of State 2004.
3 See About.com. n.d. (b).
4 See About.com. n.d. (b).
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networks in the country. This source indicates that Christians make up over 
90% of the country’s population. And the powerful influence of the Catholic 
Church can be deduced from the figures pertaining to the years 1990-2000 
in which its members numbered more than half of the Christian population. 
Table 1 depicts DR Congo’s religious demography:
Table 1: 































































population 37,363,000 45,421,244 51,654,000 104,788,000
Source: Barrett, Kurian & Johnson (2001:211).
It can be seen from Table 1 that Christianity grew at 3.36 percent annually 
in the DR Congo whilst the annual growth rate for the Catholic Church 
Ayo Whetho & Ufo Okeke Uzodike Religious Networks in Post-conflict Democratic Republic of the Congo
63
is put at 3.44 percent.5 With its extensive membership and the associated 
influence, the Catholic Church has been described as a ‘proto-state’ 
(Callaghy 1984:176). And during the conflict epoch, the Commission for 
Africa (2005:120) described the Catholic Church as the only reasonable 
coherent organisation in the country, which functioned as a post office in 
the absence of a national postal service. Other religious organisations such 
as the Église du Christ au Congo (ECC) – Church of Christ in the Congo – 
and the Kimbanguist Church also wield tremendous influence in the DRC 
as a result of their significant memberships, immense resources, and strong 
external ties. It can be argued that the influence these networks have on the 
generality of the Congolese may rival (or even surpass) that of the state in 
view of the enduring state incapacitation arising from years of misrule and 
protracted conflict. Haynes (1993:116) argues that these religious networks 
are autonomous structures beyond the state’s control and that they provide 
development goods, which the state has been unable or unwilling to supply 
to the Congolese. Against this backdrop, it is clear that religious networks 
are important and powerful actors in DR Congo’s public sphere. Their 
importance as key actors in DR Congo’s civil society is also beyond doubt if 
their roles as social service providers are considered. 
It is apposite to mention that religious networks have also facilitated the 
initiatives that led to the formal cessation of hostilities in the DRC. In 
particular, the Catholic Church joined forces with other civil society actors 
to garner support for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) which was 
convened at Sun City, South Africa in April 2003. It was at the ICD that the 
various belligerents in the DRC conflict signed a cease-fire agreement, which 
culminated in the formation of a transitional government. It is instructive to 
note that the Catholic Church sponsored a number of delegates to the ICD, 
5 The World Christian Encyclopedia presents what is arguably the most comprehensive 
information on religious affiliation on country-by-country basis. Hence, it is possible to 
provide a sketch of religious affiliation in the DRC on the basis of these figures that are 
widely accepted. However, we hasten to add that a Christian bias is not unlikely in this 
encyclopedic presentation as population figures do have political and strategic implica-
tions in many countries.
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thus underlining its key role in the peace process.6 This is one of the several 
peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by DR Congo’s religious networks in 
the period leading to the formal declaration of the end to the country’s 
conflict.7 That said, faith-based actors in the DRC have had to play other 
crucial roles in the post-conflict epoch. This paper now examines these roles 
and prognosticates the future of the Congolese state, taking into cognisance 
the centrality of religious actors to the process of resuscitating the state.
Supporting the democratic transition: religious networks 
in post-conflict DRC
…for many years, the Church has had to take the role of the state… 
[and the performance of that role represents] a moral obligation.8
Historically, religious networks had been engaged in public service delivery 
prior to the eruption of conflict in the DRC. And the onset of war did 
make religious groups’ constructive intervention in public life absolutely 
imperative. Further, the formal declaration regarding the end of hostilities 
(or the end of the transition process) did not obviate the need for faith-based 
social action as the Congolese government is still struggling to establish 
state authority across the country as at the time of writing this paper (and 
probably in the foreseeable future). Government’s control over Congolese 
territory has been hampered and continues to be hindered by the military 
operations and atrocities on the part of the Mayi-Mayi and other militias 
(notably the group led by ‘renegade’ General Laurent Nkunda) in the eastern 
part of DR Congo. However, in recent times, the Kabila administration and 
MONUC9 have been making efforts to deal with the security situation in 
6 Interview with a Congolese journalist, Kinshasa, 22 Nov 2005.
7 We have examined the salient contributions of the major religious actors to the DRC’s 
peace process elsewhere. For details, see Whetho & Uzodike, forthcoming (b).
8 Iyananio Molingi of the Diocese of Kasongo, Manirema Province, quoted in IRIN 2006a.
9  MONUC is the French acronym for the United Nations peacekeeping force in the DRC: 
Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo i.e. United Nations 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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the east. Overall, all the provinces of the DRC were made (relatively) safe for 
the general elections that were held in August 2006 (the first round) and in 
October 2006 (the second round). Given the relative peace (or the cessation 
of pervasive hostilities) in DR Congo and the successful conclusion of 
the elections, the focus of peacebuilding initiatives by religious networks 
and other civil society organisations shifted (expectedly) to (medium- to 
long-term) initiatives aimed not only at promoting reconciliation and 
fostering national unity but also creating the ambience conducive for the 
reconstruction and resuscitation of state institutions.
The first half of 2006 was marked by an increased national awareness 
campaign intended to sensitise voters about the 2006 elections. Against the 
backdrop of an obvious realisation of the powerful influence of religious 
groups, the Commission Électorale Indépendante (CEI – or the Independent 
Electoral Commission) co-opted faith-based organisations into its 
preparations for the elections. The CEI equally carried along other non-
religious civil society actors in the implementation of its mandate. While 
launching its voter education campaign in April 2006, the CEI distributed 
sensitisation materials and presented its operational plan for civic action 
and electoral education to civil society actors including DR Congo’s religious 
organisations. The CEI’s operational plan underscored ‘the participation 
of multiple actors in the campaign, including the media, non-state actors, 
civil society organisations, such as churches, syndicates and other traditional 
leaders’ (Wisniewska/MONUC 2006) in the political process [emphasis 
added]. Specifically, the CEI trained religious leaders and other civil society 
actors as part of its capacity-building efforts, which enabled them to promote 
awareness about the elections.
At another level, the United Nations also held consultations with non-
state actors with a view to promoting their participation in the electoral 
process. For instance, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary General 
for UN Peacekeeping Operations, visited the DR Congo in March 2006 to 
consolidate the collaboration between the UN and other stakeholders in 
the political process. Alwira/MONUC (2006) reported: ‘Mr. Guéhenno met 
Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo, Chairman of the Episcopal Conference in 
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the DR Congo to promote civil society involvement in the [2006 general] 
elections’. On that occasion, Archbishop Monsengwo ‘told the media that 
civil society networks would do all they [could] to discourage and appease 
those trying to create tension in the democratic process in the DRC’ (Alwira/
MONUC 2006). Archbishop Monsengwo’s statement lends credence to the 
capacity of DR Congo’s religious groups, as well as other civil society groups, 
to promote a culture of peace and to mobilise citizens towards massive 
participation in constructive national processes. 
Accordingly, religious groups in DR Congo’s post-conflict epoch 
intensified peace education and electoral sensitisation campaigns within 
their constituencies and in local communities at large. This initiative 
was undertaken against the realisation that a peaceful and stable DRC – 
in essence, the country’s future – would be determined by the successful 
conduct of the 2006 general elections and, more importantly, the people’s 
acceptance of the outcomes.10 Therefore, the task before religious groups 
in the aftermath of the elections was to foster reconciliation (first between 
aggrieved politicians) and to intensify peace advocacy in communities where 
the recourse to violence was likely due to discontent with the outcomes from 
the democratic transition process. 
However, the success of the elections and post-transition peace was 
threatened by factors as the resistance to disarmament and demobilisation 
and, more significantly, the threat of violence by some supporters of 
defeated presidential candidate, Jean-Pierre Bemba.11 The significance of 
these factors brings the implications of the elections to the fore. Although 
elections per se do not automatically translate to stability, the successful 
conclusion of the DRC elections – described as ‘the most significant in Africa 
10 Interview with JDK, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, 30 Apr 2006.
11 The results of the second round of the presidential elections, as announced by the CEI on 
November 15, 2006, showed that Joseph Kabila, the incumbent president, won 58.05 percent 
of the vote and Jean-Pierre Bemba, the main opposition leader, 41.95 percent. However, 
Bemba’s camp immediately denounced the results, alleging vote rigging by Kabila, thereby 
heightening fears of possible post-election violence. See British Broadcasting Corporation 
2006b.
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since Nelson Mandela was elected as South Africa’s president in 1994’12 – 
offered Congolese a window of opportunity to build sustainable peace. The 
elections held the potential to help establish the framework for a legitimate 
government in which case the (elected) leaders could count on the people’s 
support for reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in the post-transition 
period. With the benefit of hindsight, the general election was perceived as 
one that could create the ambience for stability, which the DRC needed (and 
still needs) in order to put itself on the path to sustainable development. 
The success of the elections was also crucial for central Africa: a peaceful 
DRC was (and is) sine qua non for a stable regional neighbourhood. Indeed, 
a peaceful DRC stood the chance of becoming an economic powerhouse 
in central Africa and this should give impetus to the process of regional 
integration and development. 
As noted above, harnessing the (potential) positive gains of a successful 
democratic transition depended on the acceptability of the election results 
by losers (and their supporters). The fact that some Congolese were 
disinclined towards a Kabila victory (and consequently, a Kabila presidency) 
which they viewed as a recipe for chaos, raised serious concerns as to the 
stability of the DRC.13 Given their massive support across the country,14 
notable political figures opposed to Kabila (Jean-Pierre Bemba and Etienne 
Tshisekedi being the prominent ones) were seen as key to the success or 
failure of the transition. It was feared that their supporters might seek to 
undermine the authority of the government unless these political leaders 
demonstrated a strong commitment to do otherwise. It was suspected that 
the DRC might lapse into crisis or slide back into the throes of another war if 
the frustration arising from electoral defeat was not satisfactorily addressed. 
In other words, many feared that the contestations of the post-transition 
12 See British Broadcasting Corporation 2006b.
13 A cross section of Congolese society has consistently questioned Joseph Kabila’s nation-
ality. This group of people has repeatedly alleged that Kabila is not Congolese, that he 
is a puppet of the international community (read, the West) and that his election to DR 
Congo’s presidency would further divide the country and exacerbate the country’s crisis. 
See British Broadcasting Corporation 2006a.
14 Interview with JDK, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, 30 Apr 2006.
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epoch might become new sources of tensions that could undermine the 
success of the elections and consequently threaten the relative but fragile 
peace and stability that the country enjoyed after the elections. Abbe Paulin 
Kalala, a Roman Catholic Church priest in Mbuji Mayi, argued poignantly 
that it was ‘possible and even probable that after the elections there [would] 
be conflict and even war, unless we [entered] into the process of negotiation 
[to deal with the issues in contention]’ (IRIN 2006b). It was also ‘feared that 
the… warlords [might] go back to fighting [in which case the] failure [of the 
elections would] be so catastrophic, [with the possibility that] the country 
[might] be divided up like Yugoslavia…’ (IRIN 2006b). 
In view of the foregoing, religious leaders have had to play a role in ‘healing 
the wounds’ of the democratic transition. For instance, faith-based actors 
were instrumental to reconciling both Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba after 
the latter rejected the election results. Specifically, Catholic bishops brought 
pressure to bear on both leaders as it urged them to seek a peaceful solution 
to the electoral crisis by accepting and supporting the mediation process led 
by the United Nations.15
The intervention by religious groups in order to defuse tensions before and 
after the presidential elections provides a pointer to their continued future 
engagement and importance in the maintenance of peace in the DRC. In 
this regard, religious actors’ intervention in the crisis in the east becomes 
imperative. Since the completion of the elections and the inauguration of 
the new government, DR Congo’s religious groups have been emphasising 
the need for the political class to act responsibly and to put the country first, 
rather than to allow parochial interests to scuttle the relative peace in the 
country.16 This was not unprecedented, since the Roman Catholic Church 
had stressed – through its Pastoral Letters – the absolute necessity for 
politicians to build bridges of understanding as the democratic transition 
neared its terminal stages.17 
15 Interview with a Congolese priest, JCA, Durban, South Africa, 5 Dec 2006.
16 Interview with SB, Kinshasa 12 Jun 2007.
17 Interview with a university professor, Lubumbashi, 14 May 2006.
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Apart from the preceding, it is worth noting that Laurent Monsengwo – 
the Archbishop of Kisangani, the president of the Conférence épiscopale 
nationale du Congo (CENCO) [the National Episcopal Conference of the 
Congo] and head of the Roman Catholic Church in the DR Congo – a key 
political mediator in the country since the time of the late president Mobutu 
Sese Seko – envisioned a greater role for religious groups in promoting 
sustainable peace and facilitating the collaborative approach towards 
handling political differences between politicians in the post-transition 
epoch. For example, the Roman Catholic Church, in collaboration with other 
faith-based networks and civil society actors, gave support to the convocation 
of consultative forums for the reconciliation of political differences and for 
consensus building which, of course, is germane to creating the conditions 
necessary for long-term stability and economic prosperity in the DRC.18 
In the light of the foregoing, Congolese can look forward to increasing 
civil society engagement (including religious networks’ involvement) in 
DR Congo’s public sphere with a view to building on the potential gains 
of a successful (at least so far and barring a recourse to war) democratic 
transition. But in view of the crisis in eastern DR Congo, one may conclude 
reasonably that the prospect for peace in the DRC is either sound or parlous, 
depending on the commitment of political actors and continuous support 
from the international community towards addressing the root causes of 
instability in the country. In fact, it is impossible to conceive of an entirely 
localised framework for resolving the DRC’s problems; the support of the 
international community is central to the success of the peacebuilding 
initiatives by governmental and civil society actors.
A case for sustained external support: the international 
community and the DRC’s future
On the basis of the above, it is worth noting that the international 
community has been deeply involved and supportive of efforts by the 
people of the DRC to build peace. Apart from the peacekeeping role of the 
18 Interview with a Congolese, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, 6 Nov 2006.
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United Nations, regional and global actors were also instrumental in giving 
impetus to the democratic transition. Suffice it to say that the international 
community’s engagement has taken cognisance of the need to collaborate 
with DR Congo’s civil society actors. The United Nations Security Council’s 
‘whirlwind working tour’ of the DRC in mid-June 2006 is a case in point. 
In an apparent recognition of the role of faith-based networks in the 
(post-conflict) democratic transition process, the UN Security Council 
delegation’s itinerary included ‘a meeting with the heads of the various 
religious organisations in the DRC’ which have been recognised as one of the 
‘many important actors in the Congolese election process’ (Young/MONUC 
2006). Such engagement by the international community, one which lends 
critical support to local initiatives, assumes greater significance in view 
of the massive challenges facing the Congolese state in terms not only of 
sustaining peace after the elections, but also in regard to reconstruction and 
the re-assertion of state authority over the entire DR Congo territory. In 
fact, it would be illogical for the international community to disengage now 
that the authority of the new government is being constrained by the crisis 
in the east. 
Against this backdrop, the international community has an all-important 
role to play in building sustainable peace in the DRC. The main role of the 
international community in the short-, medium- and long-term periods 
should be to lend critical support to initiatives by the Congolese people to 
foster reconciliation, rebuild infrastructure and resuscitate state institutions. 
The United Nations in particular, through MONUC, will have to sustain 
the process of demobilisation of (ex-)combatants and militias, especially in 
eastern DRC. The people of DR Congo require sustained, active and even 
greater engagement by international actors on the long road to recovery 
and stability. The Congolese government will need the assistance of the 
international community in resolving the crisis of governance, reviving 
the health and education systems and creating conditions necessary for 
investment and for economic growth. It is in these areas that the specialised 
agencies of the UN will have to play vital roles. In the long term, the 
international community (in collaboration with local actors) will have to 
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assist the Congolese to nurture a culture of (unwavering commitment to) 
peace. Within this context, one can envision sustained commitment on 
the part of all actors, including the United Nations and indeed, religious 
networks, to the peacebuilding process in the DRC.
By and large, DR Congo’s religious groups in the post-conflict period have 
focused on supporting the democratic transition through civic education 
and advocating responsibility by the political class. The import of their role 
in the post-conflict epoch had been the nurturing of an environment within 
which a successful transition could be conducted. This role was underscored 
by the realisation that the recently concluded elections were crucial to 
the future stability of the Congolese state. The successful conduct of the 
elections and the resolution of the post-election crisis engendered optimism 
regarding a peaceful, stable, and prosperous post-transition chapter in the 
DRC’s history. However, this optimism is being dampened by the instability 
in the eastern part of the country. Now that the Congolese government is 
gradually finding its feet, this paper – given its objective – next addresses 
these questions: What should be the role(s) of DR Congo’s faith-based 
networks in the post-transition epoch and in the not too distant future? 
Would the cessation of conflict, the successful conduct of elections and the 
subsequent inauguration of a democratically elected government (buoyed 
by the people’s mandate) obviate the involvement of religious networks 
in DR Congo’s social and political space? The next section ruminates on 
the roles of religious actors in the post-transition epoch and concludes 
thereafter with recommendations that should inform not only faith-based 
peacebuilding but also the involvement of religious actors in the process 
of state reconstruction. These recommendations draw from the empirical 
findings (of field research) on religiously motivated peacebuilding in the 
DRC.
Religious networks and the future of DR Congo
An accurate prognostication about the future of a phenomenon in the 
social sciences is very difficult. Expressed differently, it is tricky to predict 
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with absolute certainty what future trends or situations will be. This 
problématique arises, inter alia, from the complexities of social science 
phenomena, the limitation of human episteme and the fact that events 
do not necessarily follow linear or unidimensional logic. This prognostic 
complexity notwithstanding, the predictive facet of social science research 
remains an important element in empirical scholarly inquiry. As a matter of 
fact, it is the element of prognostication that often provides the background 
or justification for further research as it provokes ‘new’ thinking or the ‘other’ 
view, which may lead to the substantiation, or revision, or invalidation of 
theories, for instance.19 However, it is fitting to add that the ‘fear’ of being 
confuted has not been and should not be too strong to deter scholars from 
embarking on prognostic analysis of social science phenomena. Here too, 
this paper undertakes a futuristic analysis, but of the roles of faith-based 
actors in the DRC. Suffice it to note that prognostication is often based on 
the objective interpretation of, and deductions or inferences from, past and 
current realities. In other words, past and present scenarios tend to define 
the future, and scholars often draw from these scenarios when making 
predictions, albeit with due recourse to the ceteris paribus caveat. In line with 
this ‘tradition’, this section forecasts the expected roles of religious networks 
in the post-transition period in the DRC.
The analysis in this section derives from the incontrovertible conception that 
state deflation or state collapse incapacitates the institutions of governance. 
Typically, a post-conflict environment creates the necessary imperative to 
reconstitute the state or rebuild its institutions as the case may be. And the 
advent of a new administration in the aftermath of a successful post-conflict 
transition process is more often than not accompanied by multifarious 
challenges, which the new regime may not be (adequately) equipped to 
surmount. A new regime may be faced with the tasks of establishing and/
or consolidating its authority, reforming the security sector, building or 
reconstructing infrastructure, engendering national reconciliation, and 
19 Take for example, Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ prognostic thesis (as it then 
was), which subsequently engendered a robust scholarly engagement vis-à-vis the main 
factors that would precipitate conflict in the post-Cold War international system.
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seeking to ensure the provision of basic social services. The enormity of 
these challenges may even overwhelm the new regime to such an extent that 
this state of affairs gives civil society actors comparative advantage in the 
public sphere. Posner (2004:239-240) posits that state collapse (or deflation) 
undergirds civil society’s role in governance in which case non-state actors 
provide public goods and substitute for a state that cannot yet fully function. 
In the case of the DRC, the inauguration of Kabila’s government has not 
obviated religious actors’ engagement in the delivery of ‘public goods’. In 
fact, insufficient state capacity and government’s preoccupation with the 
insurrection in the east will underpin the continued provision of social 
services by religious networks, which represent the foremost constituency in 
DR Congo’s civil society.
In conjunction with other non-state actors, faith-based organisations will, 
for the foreseeable future, play pivotal roles in the public sphere. There 
is little doubt that the Kabila administration is constrained by challenges 
to its authority. Within this context, for instance, the reluctance or, more 
significantly, the resistance to demobilisation and disarmament by some 
militias, especially in the eastern part of the DRC, presents immediate 
and future challenges for security sector reform and for DR Congo’s long-
term stability. It can be reasonably forecast that the Kabila government will 
continue to be heavily burdened vis-à-vis the containment of violence and 
the maintenance of security. Civil society actors or (as the case may be) the 
most powerful non-state actors such as religious networks will then have to 
continue to perform certain public functions that otherwise should be the 
preserve of the government.
As the government tries to consolidate its authority and build security (in 
the eastern part of the DRC in particular), faith-based organisations will 
continue to find themselves, perhaps, as the only actors that are capable of 
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delivering ‘public goods.’20 In fact, DR Congo’s religious networks have a rich 
reservoir of history and experience to tap from as far as the performance of 
social and political roles is concerned. Back in 2006, it was noted that faith-
based actors would be involved in the rehabilitation of public infrastructure 
such as roads, hospitals, and schools in DR Congo’s post-transition period. 21 
In addition, the churches, in collaboration with both local and international 
non-governmental and governmental organisations will have to support 
an ambitious programme to rehabilitate former combatants (those who 
have been demobilised or disarmed) in order to prevent their recourse to 
violence. This role lends credence to the conflict transformational role of 
religious actors. More than that, the performance of the aforementioned 
functions by religious and non-religious civil society actors compensates for 
insufficient state capacity. 
Another pointer to the anticipated continued performance of pivotal roles 
by DR Congo’s religious groups in the post-transition period came in March 
2006 during the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s visit to the country. 
While in Kinshasa, Annan held talks with a number of stakeholders in the 
DRC’s peace and transition processes, including religious leaders. On that 
occasion, Laurent Monsengwo, the President of the country’s Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference and the Archbishop of Kisangani, presented a request 
to the UN to the effect that an International Criminal Court (ICC) be set 
up for the DRC to try perpetrators of war crimes not just for the sake of 
retributive justice but also to ensure that compensation is paid to victims, 
‘individual families and the Catholic archdiocese alike’.22 Having made the 
request for a tribunal for DR Congo, it is anticipated that the country’s 
religious groups will play a prominent role in the processes that would 
culminate in the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes and crimes 
20 It is however necessary to point out that the extent to which religious networks (and other 
civil society actors) can function in this regard would depend partly on the level of security 
or stability in the DRC. There is no gainsaying the fact that non-state actors cannot func-
tion effectively where the necessary prerequisites of stability and security are lacking in the 
polity (Posner 2004: 247).
21 Interview with Pastor JPM, Kinshasa, 30 Mar 2006.
22 See Allafrica.com. n.d.
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against humanity.23 One can foresee a role for DRC’s religious groups in the 
process of accounting for the past and forging reconciliation. This brings us 
to another hoped-for pivotal engagement by DR Congo’s religious actors in 
the post-transition period: serving as catalysts for national reconciliation.
Faith-based actors in the DRC would have to deepen their engagement 
in the process of national reconciliation. Ex-fighters and even politicians 
(especially those who might feel aggrieved by the outcome of the last 
transition process) still need to be reconciled. It is especially important for 
religious leaders to galvanise public interest in the national reconciliation 
process. Besides, faith-based actors need to hold consultations with other 
civil society actors in order to establish the modalities for a post-transition 
countrywide process of reconciling aggrieved parties. Hence, it is anticipated 
that in the foreseeable future, religious groups will sustain the national 
reconciliation process either as its custodians (primarily driving the process) 
or as facilitators (supporting the government’s reconciliation efforts).
There is no doubt that the conflict in the DRC has had a concomitant 
deleterious effect on not only physical infrastructure but also the country’s 
human resources. So many Congolese, including the country’s ‘best brains’, 
are outside the borders of the DRC. The new regime will sorely need the 
best human resources possible in order to deliver ‘public goods’ and 
promote sustainable development. Even when some Congolese abroad do 
return home, the core of the country’s public service will consist of those 
who had remained in the DRC. The Kabila administration will have to 
work through a civil service that is heavily disoriented, de-motivated and 
emasculated by autocracy and corruption – some of the infamous legacies 
of ‘Mobutuism’. This poses a serious challenge to the government, and if the 
new administration were to surmount this hurdle, considerable reform in 
23 The ICC has assumed jurisdiction for the crimes perpetrated in the DRC conflict and 
has issued warrants of arrest in certain cases, the most notable being those for Thomas 
Lubanga (former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots militia in Ituri) and Germain 
Katanga (former leader of the Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri). Lubanga and Katanga 
are on trial at the court.
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public service – in terms of orientation and efficient service delivery – will 
be needed. 
It can be safely prognosticated that the success of the regime, say with regard 
to good governance and social service delivery, will depend to a large extent 
on individual and institutional capacity building. Here again, civil society, 
which embraces DRC’s religious networks, will play a role in building the 
capacities of public servants towards promoting good governance and 
effective social service delivery. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, 
has demonstrated its ability to lend support to capacity building for good 
governance in many African countries through its Justice, Development 
and Peace Commissions. In the DRC, Roman Catholic Church leaders are 
not oblivious of the need to do the same in the post-transition epoch.24 
Its extensive international connections give the Roman Catholic Church 
considerable leverage to implement capacity-building programmes for 
political leaders and public servants. The Church could collaborate with both 
local and international (non-)governmental organisations for the sake of 
bringing this idea to fruition. Given religious groups’ antecedents, therefore, 
one can expect to see the Roman Catholic Church – just one of the faith-
based actors in the DRC – embark on political conscientisation and activism 
in some way similar to its advocacy in the Mobutu era. Such engagement, it 
should be noted, would be geared towards ensuring good governance on the 
part of the new government that derives its mandate from the people. 
Against the backdrop of the pivotal place of religious networks in the DRC 
and their strategic leverage as agents of social mobilisation, it can be said 
that they are important stakeholders in the project of charting the DRC’s 
future. Although DR Congo’s religious groups do not, stricto sensu, measure 
up to groups that have the means to precipitate violence on a massive scale 
or the means to subdue it (such as militias, the national army, MONUC), the 
country’s faith-based organisations hold the allegiance of the generality of 
Congolese given the number of their adherents. Hence, religious networks 
have the capacity – no matter how minuscule – to either promote stability 
24 Interview with Reverend Father FGM, Katanga, 18 Nov 2005.
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or subvert the peace process and, ultimately, jeopardise the country’s future 
depending on what they ‘feed’ their members with. Given the socially 
ambivalent roles that religion plays in public life, religious groups can mobilise 
their members for both constructive and destructive ends. Therefore, the 
end to which DR Congo’s faith-based organisations mobilise their members 
will impinge on the country’s future. Should religious networks continue 
with their constructive roles in the post-transition period, they would be 
contributing to the building of a sustainable climate of peace which, in turn, 
would guarantee a stable and secure future for the DRC. Suffice it to add that 
a successful African renaissance agenda needs a DRC that is at peace with 
itself and its neighbours. 
Religious groups have made immense positive contributions to the conflict 
transformation process and it is inconceivable that they would turn around 
in the future to undermine their own efforts at building sustainable peace by 
mobilising their members or deploying their resources for destructive ends. 
That would be most illogical. In fact, it is only their sustained preoccupation 
with building sustainable peace that can guarantee their continued existence 
which, in turn, promotes the realisation of their own objective to ‘save souls’. 
Having said that, this paper next concludes with logical inferences from our 
field research findings vis-à-vis religious networks’ role in the DRC’s peace 
process.
Concluding remarks
The performance of such roles as facilitating peacebuilding and providing 
social services by religious actors typifies the constructive element inherent 
in religion. However, this paper equally acknowledges that religion could be 
a contrivance for destructiveness, especially when it is used to legitimise or 
justify violence. Recourse to empiricism in establishing the opposite ends 
that religion potentially serves illustrates the ambivalence of religion. Hence, 
it does not come as a surprise that the role of religion in public life is still a 
contested terrain within the academic community. That said, most scholarly 
analyses of the nexus between religion and politics present an overarching 
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bias, which essentially ‘demonises’ religion by conceiving it, fundamentally, 
as a ‘hue in the human mosaic’ (Jordan & Rowntree 1990:190) that triggers 
and exacerbates conflict. The potential and actual (established) constructive 
roles of religion in conflict situations, more often than not, are marginalised 
or ignored in scholarly analyses. But the reality of the positive roles of faith-
based actors in the peacebuilding processes (including more significantly 
when and where state actors are not trusted) underscores the need to rethink 
the role of religion in public life, if only to give expression to its ambivalence. 
This paper gives cogent representation to the ‘other’ side of religion that has 
long been ignored in conflict discourse – the constructive roles of religion 
as a viaduct for sustainable peace in societies torn apart by the spectre of 
violence.
In its exploration of the peacebuilding role of religious actors in the 
DRC, this paper predicates the performance of positive social, economic 
and political functions by faith-based groups on the notion of liberation 
theology. Although having eschatological foundations, liberation theology 
is essentially a social construct that underscores positive collective action 
towards alleviating pain and suffering. For DR Congo’s religious networks, 
inaction in the face of untold suffering (caused by war) was not only 
unthinkable but also a sin against the Supreme Being. This paper posits 
that the involvement of the DRC’s faith-based organisations in the public 
domain (either as agents of development in the pre-war and post-war years 
or as facilitators of the peacebuilding process during the conflict period) 
speaks to the intent and spirit of liberation theology. Another underlying 
causality in the involvement of DR Congo’s religious actors in the conflict 
transformation process is that faith-based networks in the DRC have 
comparative advantages in the performance of functions that otherwise 
should constitute the government’s core mandate. In a country where state 
bureaucracy has almost always existed only in name (except for Kinshasa, 
perhaps), the majority of Congolese have had to rely on non-state actors in 
the area of provision of social and other crucial life-support services. The 
onset of conflict in the DRC, this paper contends, deepened the imperative 
for religiously motivated social action for peace and development. In fact, 
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it is apt to recall here that even war-weary Congolese citizens craved for the 
involvement of faith-based actors in the peacebuilding process.25
The peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by DR Congo’s religious networks 
can be suitably situated within the context of conflict transformation. Rather 
than conducting a manipulative search for an agreement that is acceptable 
to the warring parties or one that merely satisfies the interests of the parties 
to the conflict, DRC’s religious networks have undertaken roles intended 
to generate the cumulative effect of shifting the attitudes of parties, 
transforming structures as well as relationships for durable peace and 
harmonious coexistence. The country’s faith-based actors have been seeking 
to transform not only the parties’ perceptions but also the environment 
within which the DRC conflict has occurred. Conflict transformation speaks 
to a long-term commitment to peace. The deconstruction of structures and 
attitudes that engender violence and the nurturing of ‘new’ attitudes and 
modes of organisation, interaction and social cohesion, which promote 
sustainable peace, exemplify such commitment. Therefore, it is only logical 
that the involvement of DR Congo’s religious networks in the country’s 
public sphere has taken on added significance in the post-conflict period. 
Since the conclusion of the ICD, religious groups’ initiatives have been 
directed more at the nurturing of a climate that is conducive to sustainable 
peace. One reality that illustrates the foregoing is their efforts at facilitating 
the country’s democratic transition, promoting national reconciliation and 
undertaking infrastructural reconstruction. It is this paper’s submission that 
the performance of such roles with the goal of enduring social transformation 
in mind, and the increasing attention to it in scholarly discourse, should 
engender a holistic paradigmatic approach to analysing the role of religion 
in public life. 
It is apposite to state at this juncture that the saliency of religious networks’ 
positive roles in the DRC’s conflict transformation process is underscored by 
state deflation/collapse (or what may be referred to as declining statecraft). 
In fact, the scenario in the DRC exemplifies the increasing socio-political 
25 Many of our interviewees stressed this point during field research.
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role of religion within the context of declining statecraft in Africa’s conflict 
zones. It is indisputable that faith-based actors have made (and are making) 
significant contributions to the peacebuilding and development processes 
in the DRC. And local and international reactions to religious networks’ 
roles in the public domain have been overwhelmingly positive, albeit a few 
respondents are cynical of religiously motivated peacebuilding.26 Granted, 
an objective assessment of faith-based actors’ involvement in peacebuilding 
indicates that religious organisations have given momentous impetus to 
the peace and development processes in the DRC. However, it is noted that 
some religious institutions target only their members in terms of provision 
of humanitarian assistance in which case such intervention inadvertently 
alienates those who profess other faiths – thus deepening divisions in society. 
Suffice it to add that those who have been marginalised in this regard have 
been ‘compensated’ by non-religious civil society actors (whose assistance 
to war-weary Congolese has not been defined by such factors as creed or 
religious affiliation), thereby mitigating the frustration and aggression 
that might have resulted from religiously motivated parochial or partisan 
assistance. 
As a corollary of the foregoing, this paper acknowledges that a number 
of non-religious civil society actors as well as international donor or 
humanitarian and governmental agencies have made vital contributions 
to the process of building peace in the DRC. In some way, the preceding 
speaks to the complementarity of the peacebuilding efforts by DR Congo’s 
religious networks and local or international non-religious civil society 
actors. However, this paper has focused primarily on the roles of faith-based 
actors in the DRC’s conflict transformation process and the ramifications 
of their involvement for the DRC’s future. In tackling its essential concern 
as described above, the paper recognises that faith-based peacebuilding in 
the DRC has not been without its drawbacks and, therefore, concludes with 
recommendations that should underpin religiously motivated efforts at 
building sustainable peace in societies torn apart by conflict.
26 For a comprehensive account of the diverse reactions to the involvement of faith-based 
actors in the DRC conflict, see Whetho & Uzodike, forthcoming (a).
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The first recommendation is derived from a significant drawback in faith-
based peacebuilding. As noted above, some of DR Congo’s religious networks 
have embarked on peacebuilding initiatives that can be described as partisan 
in that their programmes do not address the needs of the wider society but 
those of their members only. The implication of this is the alienation of those 
excluded in the communities in which case the actions of religious networks, 
albeit potentially, inadvertently engender divisions and ultimately conflict. 
In such instance, faith-based actors might contribute to the intensification 
of factors that precipitate conflict rather than create the conditions for unity 
or social cohesion and peace. Having said that, one has to acknowledge that 
religious organisations have a primary obligation to undertake programmes 
that target their followers at particular times. But given the inadvertent 
consequences of partisan faith-based social engagement, this paper 
recommends that religious networks focus on high profile projects that show 
them as having the capacity and interest to look beyond denominations and 
religion. For a certainty, the implementation of high profile non-partisan 
conflict transformation initiatives by DR Congo’s religious networks will 
contribute to fostering reconciliation and social cohesion.
Research findings suggest that many of DR Congo’s religious actors, especially 
religious leaders, have been implementing peacebuilding initiatives in their 
personal capacities. Besides, their performance of peacebuilding functions 
has been predicated on the ‘social mission’ drawn from religious convictions 
rather than on professionally enabled or enhanced personal capacities. 
In other words, religious groups and actors do not always possess the 
professionalism required in conflict transformation processes. Hence, there 
is the need to build the capacities of DRC’s religious actors to complement 
the theological underpinnings of faith-based conflict transformation work. 
In so doing, faith-based actors can anticipate the replication of successes 
attained by other (professionally) trained civil society actors involved in 
peacebuilding.
A corollary of the foregoing is the need to separate religiously motivated 
social action (in this case peacebuilding) from a purely religious mission such 
as proselytising. Some Congolese are critical of faith-based organisations’ 
Ayo Whetho & Ufo Okeke Uzodike 
82
involvement in public life as churches often provide social services in order 
to induce conversion. In fact, some respondents during field research were 
unreservedly cynical of (the motivations for) faith-based peacebuilding. 
Although the underlying basis for faith-based social action is religious (as 
it derives from liberation theology), the goal of such involvement should 
not be to promote the conversion of persons but rather to complement the 
efforts of local and international (non-)governmental agencies in alleviating 
the effects of political instability.
Research findings indicate that DR Congo’s religious groups have broadened 
their peacebuilding initiatives to embrace several processes in the conflict 
transformation spectrum. For instance, it is not uncommon to find that a 
faith-based organisation is involved in several processes (such as peace 
advocacy; humanitarian or relief services; negotiation, mediation or 
reconciliation; demobilisation or reintegration of ex-combatants; and 
reconstruction) at the same time. In such instances, their efforts are dispersed 
and do not yield homogeneous results. Therefore, it is necessary that 
religious groups identify areas of comparative advantage and competence 
in the peacebuilding spectrum. This will make for thorough involvement 
and deeper engagement in which case the benefits of intervention can 
be harnessed and enjoyed more fully. For now though, it can be safely 
prognosticated that religious networks will be more inclined towards 
making decisive positive contributions to the social, economic and political 
development of the DRC. 
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